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A B S T R A C T
Recent studies investigate the impact of air pollution on labor productivity. We extend this lit-
erature by showing that air pollution negatively affects equity analyst information production.
Analysts exposed to air pollution are less likely to issue timely forecasts or improve their forecast
accuracy. Investigating the underlying mechanism, we find that analysts exposed to air pollution
are less likely to provide bold (especially, negatively bold) forecasts. We also find evidence that
market pricing is less sensitive to forecast revisions issued by analysts exposed to air pollution.
Our results are robust to controlling for firm/analyst and time fixed effects, as well as additional
specifications employing difference-in-differences designs and placebo tests.
1. Introduction
In the past five years, particulate matter (PM) pollution has risen 8%, with over 80% of urban residents worldwide currently
exposed to dangerous levels of outdoor pollution (Vidal, 2016; Walsh, 2016).1 Recent economic studies find that outdoor pollution
results in a reduction of worker productivity (Chang et al., 2014; Chang et al., 2016; Dong et al., 2019; Zivin and Neidell, 2012). We
extend this enquiry by investigating whether outdoor air pollution affects analyst information production for the capital market.
We examine two related issues. First, we investigate whether PM pollution affects the timing and accuracy improvement of
analyst earnings forecast revisions in response to firm earnings announcements. Our evidence is consistent with forecasts being less
timely and of lower accuracy during polluted periods. Second, we investigate whether this effect is related to analysts having greater
difficulty in information production during polluted periods. Consistent with forecasts being less-informed, we find that when
analysts are in polluted cities during an earnings announcement, they are less likely to issue bold (especially, negatively bold)
forecasts. Forecast boldness reflects the extent to which analysts map new information into revised forecasts (Clement and Tse, 2005;
Gleason and Lee, 2003; Hong et al., 2000; Keskek et al., 2014). Our results are thus consistent with analysts reducing the extent to
which they incorporate new information into their forecasts when they are forecasting under polluted conditions. Overall, our study
advances understanding of the effects of air pollution on the work productivity of highly skilled professionals, providing additional
insights about the hidden costs associated with air pollution.
We address our research questions by examining analyst forecast revisions in response to firm earnings announcements in China.
This setting is particularly appropriate for our study. In the past two decades China has experienced severe PM pollution, which varies
by location and across time. This allows us to detect differences in analyst information production relative to changes in levels of PM
pollution for the same firm/analyst. Focusing on forecast revisions is also an important feature of our study. Although analysts may
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make a strategic trade-off between the timeliness and accuracy of their forecasts (Gul and Lundholm, 1995; Guttman, 2010), they face
greater pressure to issue forecasts directly following firm earnings announcements (Zhang, 2008). Given this pressure, analysts are
unlikely to delay their forecast revisions to reduce the negative effects of air pollution. On the other hand, our use of a short-term
window after earnings announcements to capture the effects of PM pollution mitigates the concern that confounding factors other
than air pollution are responsible for the changes in analysts forecast revisions that we observe. Taken together, these features allow a
strong test of our research questions. Finally, China's air pollution is representative of similar issues in other developing countries in
the world (e.g., Brazil, India, Iran). For decades, China has been criticized for developing its economy at the expense of the en-
vironment (Christmann and Taylor, 2001). Results from this setting may shed light on indirect costs related to such a country-level
strategy, with practical implications for many developing countries/regions worldwide that follow a similar development path.
A large number of studies suggest that air pollution worsens the performance of agents. This effect is due to its negative effects on
health (Chang et al., 2014; Chang et al., 2016; Lavy et al., 2014; Suglia et al., 2007; Zivin and Neidell, 2012) and mood (Bakian et al.,
2015; Calderon-Garciduenas et al., 2015; Lim et al., 2012; Power et al., 2015; Szyszkowicz, 2007).2 Extant research finds that air
pollution leads to biased decisions by investors (Dong et al., 2019; Heyes et al., 2016; Li et al., 2019). We extend this research to
investigate whether air pollution impacts analyst forecasts, which play an important informational role in capital markets.
Our empirical findings lend support to our hypotheses. Compared to analysts forecasting during periods of low PM pollution,
analysts exposed to the highest levels of pollution are 14% less likely to revise their earnings forecasts within a two-day short window
of earnings announcements. In addition, for forecast revisions issued during the short-term window of earnings announcements,
analysts facing the worst air pollution levels are 4% less likely to improve their forecast accuracy than are analysts experiencing good
air quality. In terms of forecast boldness, analysts facing the highest levels of air pollution are 4.8% (4.9%) less likely to issue bold
(negatively bold) forecasts compared with analysts experiencing good air quality. When benchmarked against sample means of our
dependent variables, these negative impacts are economically significant. All these findings remain robust when we include a battery
of control variables at both the firm and analyst levels, as well as firm/analyst/time fixed effects and for alternative model speci-
fications.
To strengthen our identification and rule out the possibility that the observed findings arise from high ability analysts migrating to
cities with low air pollution, we conduct difference-in-differences (hereafter diff-in-diff) designs following Li et al., 2019. To identify
the treatment sample, we require that for an analyst-firm observation, there is a stark change (at least one standard deviation) in the
air quality index (AQI) between two adjacent quarters. Use of a stark quarter-to-quarter change in AQI not only takes the advantage of
exogenous variation in air quality but also avoids the possibility that high ability analysts migrate to clean cities in short-term. For
each observation in the treatment sample, we choose an observation from the remaining sample that did not experience drastic
changes in AQI as the control observation. The control observation must have forecasts issued by an analyst from a different city but
following the same firm over the same period as the treatment observation. As a result, the difference between changes in the
dependent variables for the treatment sample and changes for the control sample over the same period should reflect the effects of air
pollution. Results from the diff-in-diff tests show that analysts exposed to air pollution (clean air) tend to issue less (more) timely, less
(more) accurate and less (more) negatively bold forecasts compared with analysts without experiencing drastic air quality changes.
Moreover, we conduct two placebo tests by randomizing PM pollution within each analyst-firm and by randomizing cities to each
analyst-quarter. Both placebo tests help mitigate the concern that our findings are driven by some time-variant city-level omitted
variables. Both tests corroborate our main findings.
To understand whether there are certain factors which could alleviate the negative effects of air pollution on analyst information
production, we partition the full sample based on several firm or analyst level characteristics and re-estimate our baseline models. We
find that factors related to both analyst supply of forecasts and investor demand for forecasts play a key role. From the supply side,
the negative effects of air pollution are more pronounced in the subsample where analysts have a higher workload or where com-
petition among analysts is weak. From the demand side, investors' high level of demand for information following annual earnings
announcements attenuates the negative effects of the PM pollution.
We also investigate whether investors understand the reduction in forecast quality when analysts provide forecasts during periods
with high levels of air pollution. We examine whether investor response to forecast revisions is moderated by the levels of air
pollution faced by analysts. We compute the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on days t and t+ 1 relative to the forecast revision
date. We then regress the CAR on an interaction term of forecast revision and air quality over the two days preceding the forecast
revision date. We find that investors respond less to forecast revisions issued after polluted days, suggesting that the market un-
derstands the negative effects of air pollution on analyst information production.
We contribute to three strands of literature. First, we extend research investigating the impact of air pollution on worker pro-
ductivity (Archsmith et al., 2016; Chang et al., 2014; Chang et al., 2016; Zivin and Neidell, 2012) and research investigating how air
pollution affects decisions made by capital market participants (Dong et al., 2019; Heyes et al., 2016; Li et al., 2019). Previous
research focuses on output of physical goods, non-financial services or investor trading behaviors. However, the study of how air
pollution affects highly skilled professionals (e.g., analysts) is very limited. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper closely
related to our study is Dong et al. (2019), who find that air pollution during analyst site visits induces more pessimistic forecasts
(forecast bias). We extend Dong et al. (2019) by examining the impact of air pollution on additional dimensions of analyst in-
formation production. First, we focus on analyst forecast revisions, which proxy for analyst information production (Clement and Tse,
2005; Keskek et al., 2014), rather than on forecast bias. Second, whereas Dong et al. (2019) examine a window of 15 days, we employ
2 See a review paper by Block et al. (2012).
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a 2-day time period. Our short-term window mitigates concerns of confounding factors underlying our results.
Second, we contribute to the literature linking weather conditions to information production (more broadly, decision making) of
market participants (Chen et al., 2017; DeHaan et al., 2017; Heyes et al., 2016; Li et al., 2019; Huang et al., 2018). Air pollution is
fundamentally different from the more general notion of weather conditions (e.g., sunshine). Unlike bad weather, air pollution can be
directly influenced by policy makers, implying that the costs of air pollution observed in our study might be controllable.3 Further,
our results hold after controlling for local weather conditions. Indeed, we find that the effect of air pollution on analyst forecast
timeliness is as large as that of weather conditions. Unlike poor weather, however, we find that air pollution significantly affects
analyst forecast accuracy and the likelihood of analysts to issue bold forecasts (particularly negatively bold forecasts). This indicates
that relative to poor weather, air pollution has large incremental impacts on analyst information production.
Finally, our study adds to the literature on determinants of analyst forecast timeliness and properties of analyst forecasts (Clement
and Tse, 2005; Yezegel, 2015; Zhang, 2008). Our findings imply that the air pollution may negatively affect functioning of the capital
market. Given that air pollution is widespread and a growing problem throughout the world, particularly in emerging countries/
regions, our findings provide insights regarding an additional indirect cost of prioritizing economic development over environmental
protection.
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the air pollution in China. Section 3 summarizes prior
literature and proposes hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design. Section 5 reports empirical findings and Section 6
concludes.
2. Particulate matter pollution in China
The Chinese government started to release the daily air quality index (AQI) in 2009. AQI calculation is based on three criteria air
pollutants and follows an algorithm developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2006). The pollutant that has the
highest index determines the AQI on a specific day. In China, the primary form of air pollution is PM, measured as detrimental
airborne particulate matter with a diameter smaller than 10 μm (PM10) (one seventh of the width of a human hair).4
Detrimental effects of PM are pervasive, since the particles can easily penetrate buildings due to their small size (Vette et al.,
2001). To curb the negative effects of PM pollution, most offices keep air filters operating during periods of high pollution. However,
the usefulness of the filters is questionable. In a survey regarding the effectiveness of air filters, 72% of respondents did not believe
that filters reduce indoor PM pollution.5 In addition to concerns about the ineffectiveness of air filters to clear indoor pollution, there
are concerns that a widely-used technology, which was developed in Western countries to filter larger pollutants (such as pollen and
dust), may be useless in cleaning Chinese PM pollutants.6 Given the limited power of air filters, air pollution can affect workers even
if they remain in their offices during polluted days (Chang et al., 2016; Dong et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019).
3. Hypothesis development
3.1. The direct influence of air pollution on analyst information production
A large body of literature provides evidence that PM pollution results in physical diseases, such as respiratory conditions and
impairment of cognitive performance (Calderon-Garciduenas et al., 2015). Lavy et al. (2014) investigate the effects of fine PM on
Israeli high school student performance on tests. Results indicate that test scores and the likelihood of students to enter university are
negatively associated with exposure to PM pollution during exam days. Suglia et al. (2007) indicate that a high level of black carbon
(a traffic pollutant) decreases intelligence and cognitive function.
PM pollution also has a negative impact on mood. Lim et al. (2012) find that increases in PM level are correlated with symptoms
of depression. After controlling for weather conditions, Szyszkowicz (2007) finds that PM pollution is positively associated with daily
depression-related emergency room visits. Power et al. (2015) find that exposure to PM2.5 pollution is associated with high
symptoms of anxiety. Building upon the negative effects of PM pollution on mood, Bakian et al. (2015) find evidence that exposure to
PM pollution increases the incidence of suicide attempts.
Based upon the negative effects of PM pollution on physical health and mood motivate, economic research has examined the
effects of air pollution on workers' marginal productivity. Zivin and Neidell (2012) find that U.S. agricultural worker productivity is
significantly harmed when there is an increase in ozone pollution levels. Chang et al. (2014) extend this enquiry by examining effects
of PM pollution on indoor workers' productivity, focusing on workers at a U.S. pear-packing factory. Their results indicate a negative
association between PM2.5 pollution and worker productivity. Chang et al. (2016) provide the first evidence that outdoor PM
pollution also affects office workers' productivity. They compare the number of calls answered by call center workers in Shanghai and
3 Market participants can move to locations with better local weather to mitigate the negative effects of bad weather. However, participants’
current locations probably reflect consideration of cost/benefit trade-offs and there are likely significant frictions associated with changing locations
in the short term.
4 Other systems track particles as small as 2.5μm (PM2.5). For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has set standards for both
PM10 and PM2.5 (see https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/pm/s_pm_history.html)
5 Details at: http://view.news.qq.com/original/intouchtoday/n2944.html
6 Details at: http://www.kongqiwu.com/m/index.php?m=default.information_list&catid=23&sCatid=37&id=65
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Nantong on high PM pollution versus low PM pollution days and find that workers exposed to high PM pollution answer fewer calls.
Further analysis indicates that the reduction in workers' productivity is mainly driven by their reluctance to work during high
pollution days. Archsmith et al. (2016) study professional baseball umpires—a setting with highly-skilled and quality-focused em-
ployees, who make complex decisions. They find that an increase in Carbon Monoxide/PM2.5 pollution increases the propensity of
umpires to make incorrect calls.
An emerging body of studies investigates how the negative mood induced by poor environmental conditions affects investor
behavior in the capital market. Heyes et al. (2016) find that one standard deviation increase in PM2.5 is associated with an 11.9%
decrease in the same-day return. They argue that this result may be driven by decreased risk tolerance due to pollution-induced
changes in mood or cognitive function. DeHaan et al. (2017) document that, earnings announced on bad weather days exhibit high
post earnings announcement drift and low trading volume, implying that bad weather reduces investors' ability to digest earnings
news. In their study of the impact of bad weather on analysts, DeHaan et al. (2017) find that relative to those exposed to good
weather, analysts exposed to bad weather are less likely to revise their forecasts. These analysts also issue more pessimistic forecasts
in response to earnings announcements. Chen et al. (2017) document that the negative mood induced by bad weather also leads to
pessimism in management forecasts. Focusing on air pollution, Dong et al. (2019) find that analysts who make site visits to companies
on polluted days tend to issue more pessimistic forecasts.
Building upon the above literature, we argue that PM pollution may negatively affect the analyst's ability and motivation to
process information contained in earnings announcements to provide a forecast. Forecasting is a complex task, for which analysts
must consider not only firm-specific but also intra/inter- industry information (Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004; Jacob et al., 1999;
Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004). In addition to skill and knowledge, the analyst's physical health, proper cognitive performance, and
mood can impact forecasting ability. Moreover, as illustrated by Chang et al. (2016), if PM pollution reduces analysts' willingness to
work (i.e., to synthesize information and formulate a forecast), analysts are unlikely to effectively process the information embedded
in earnings announcements.
Prior literature suggests that analysts trade off late issuance of more accurate forecasts with early issuance of relatively inaccurate
forecasts (Gul and Lundholm, 1995; Guttman, 2010). To compensate for the negative impacts of PM pollution on their information
processing, analysts seeking to reduce the effect of pollution on their forecast quality may postpone issuing a revised forecast fol-
lowing earnings announcements. However, since investors may value early, low accuracy forecasts that lead peer analysts' forecasts
and provide more timely signals, in the face of high PM pollution, analysts may choose to issue an early forecast even though the
pollution has deterred them from fully synthesizing the information in earnings. Based upon this discussion, our hypotheses explore
the timing and quality impacts of PM pollution:
H1a. There is a negative association between PM pollution and the likelihood of analysts issuing forecast revisions immediately after earnings
announcements.
H1b. Improvement in forecast accuracy from forecast revisions following earnings announcements is lower for analysts facing high PM
pollution.
3.2. Channels underlying PM pollution's effect on analyst forecasts
Hypotheses H1a and H1b build on the assumption that air pollution constrains analysts' information production within a short
window after earnings announcements. Consistent with Truman (1994), Gleason and Lee (2003), Clement and Tse (2005) and Keskek
et al. (2014), we argue that revised analyst forecasts, benchmarked against their own prior forecasts and peer analyst prior forecast
consensus, reflect analyst information production. Gleason and Lee (2003) provide evidence that deviation from the prevailing
consensus by an individual analyst (i.e., issuing a bold forecast) is associated with a stronger market reaction than when the analyst
merely mimics peer forecasts. Clement and Tse (2005) find that bold forecasts are more accurate than other forecasts, and that
herding forecasts are indicative of lower forecasting ability.
Bold forecasts not only reveal the analyst's private information to the market, but also signal the analyst's confidence in fore-
casting and the analyst's skill (Clement and Tse, 2005; Ramnath et al., 2008). Although both high- and low-ability analysts may issue
bold forecasts (Clarke and Subramanian, 2006), career concerns of analysts reduce the incidence of this behavior, since inaccurate
forecasts are associated with higher likelihood of career termination (Clement and Tse, 2005; Hong and Kubik, 2003). Further, when
forecasts are bold, investors attribute poor forecasting quality to low analyst ability and effort (Kadous et al., 2009). Because pol-
lution negatively affects information synthesis by analysts, we expect analysts experiencing pollution to be less willing to provide
bold forecasts. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2a. There is a negative association between PM pollution and forecast boldness for forecast revisions issued within a short window after
earnings announcements.
Prior studies find that analysts are likely to issue optimistic forecasts because of conflicts of interest and/or cognitive bias (Beyer
et al., 2010; Ramnath et al., 2008). Analysts may want to appear optimistic to facilitate their access to management, to advance their
career, or to win investment banking business (Hong and Kubik, 2003; Ke and Yu, 2006; Michaely and Womack, 1999; O'Brien et al.,
2005). Cognitive biases can also lead to over-optimism among analysts (Kadous et al., 2006; Sedor, 2002), which may be expressed in
a positively bold forecast.
The optimism literature implies asymmetry in analysts' reluctance to issue positively or negatively bold forecasts. Although
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pollution can keep analysts from fully synthesizing the information in earnings, the benefits arising from positively bold forecasts
(Hong and Kubik, 2003; Ke and Yu, 2006; Michaely and Womack, 1999; O'Brien et al., 2005), can potentially override the reticence of
analysts to make positively bold forecasts in the face of pollution.
Issuing negatively bold forecasts is arguably more costly for an analyst than issuing positively bold forecasts since negative
information is relatively penalized. Because of the additional risk to the analyst associated with providing a negatively bold forecast,
analysts will only issue negatively bold forecasts if results of extensive information processing substantiate the decision. If high PM
levels affect the analyst's ability to synthesize information, the analyst is less likely to have processed information sufficiently to
substantiate a negatively bold forecast. We summarize the hypothesis as follows:
H2b. The negative association between PM pollution and forecast boldness for forecast revisions issued within a short window after earnings
announcements is stronger for negatively bold forecasts than for positively bold forecasts.
4. Research design
4.1. Model specification
To test the timeliness and accuracy of analyst forecasts, in model (1) we follow several recent studies and apply a linear prob-
ability model to estimate the probability of the analyst (i) issuing earnings forecasts in response to quarterly earnings announcements
(j) (DeHaan et al., 2017; Hanlon and Hoopes, 2014; Hoberg et al., 2014).7
= + + + + + +TL ACCURACY LOG AQI X QTR[ , ] _ t0 1 j q (1)
where TL equals 1 if an analyst revises his forecasts within two days (i.e. day 0, which is the earnings announcement date and day 1,
which is the following day) of a quarterly earnings announcement of firm j, 0 otherwise (Zhang, 2008).8 Following Clement and Tse
(2005) and Keskek et al. (2014), we define ACCURACY based upon whether an analyst's current forecast improves his own forecast
accuracy surrounding earnings announcements. ACCURACY equals 1 if the analyst's revised earnings forecast accuracy is higher than
his own prior earnings forecast accuracy, 0 otherwise.9AQI equals the average daily air quality index between the earnings an-
nouncement date and the analyst forecast revision date if an earnings forecast is issued within two days of the earnings an-
nouncement date. If the earnings forecast is not issued within this short window, we measure AQI over the two-day window (DeHaan
et al., 2017). In our study, AQI is measured for each analyst, according to the air pollution level in his own location (city). Higher
values of AQI correspond to higher levels of air pollution. Following Li et al., 2019, we use the logarithm of AQI to ensure that the
outliers do not disproportionally affect the results. θj and λq represent firm and year fixed effects respectively, which remove firm-
invariant and time-invariant characteristics affecting the likelihood of analysts to issue timely forecasts. QTRt denotes indicator
variables for earnings announcement quarters. Negative coefficients of LOG_AQI are consistent with our expectation that analyst
issuance of forecasts is postponed (H1a) and that forecasts issued within the short window of earnings announcements are less likely
to represent improvements in accuracy (H2a) when analysts face PM pollution.
The vector X consists of a battery of both analyst- and firm-level control variables. All analyst-level control variables are defined in
the year preceding the earnings announcement dates, unless stated otherwise. N_FIRM measures the number of firms the analyst
follows. N_IND measures the number of unique industries the analyst follows. STAR equals 1 if the analyst was awarded the title of
star analyst by the NEW FORTURE magazine in the preceding calendar year, otherwise 0. SIZE_BROKER measures the number of
analysts employed by the analyst's brokerage. EXP is the number of quarters between the analyst's first forecast report date recorded
in the database and the current earnings announcement date. N_FOLLOW is the number of analysts who issued at least one report for
the firm.
The remaining control variables are at the firm-level. HOLDPERCT is the percentage of shares held by funds. LEV is total liabilities
deflated by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total market capitalization on the day before the earnings announcement. MB equals
7 Throughout the paper, we employ linear probability model (LPM) rather than non-linear model with limited dependent variable (LDV) where the
dependent variables are dichotomous (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). There are two advantages in our setting to use LPM: 1) Greene (2004) shows that
including fixed effects in a LDV model can severely bias both coefficient and standard error estimators when there is a small ‘T' in the panel data (a
unique firm only exists for a short period) and this bias persists even for ‘T' up to 20. Our sample period spans from 2009 to 2016 which probably
suffers from the small ‘T’ problem; and 2) the linear probability model allows easier interpretation of the coefficient of our interested variable than
the non-linear LDV model because the coefficient directly indicates the marginal effect of our interested variable. In addition, to ensure that LPM fits
the data well, following Hanlon and Hoopes (2014), we check the range of the fitted values of dependent variables and find that< 5% predicted
values of the dependent variables fall outside of [0,1].
8 To define the TL measure, we require an interval spanning from the quarter t earnings announcement date to the day before the quarter t+1
earnings announcement date as the period where analysts could provide forecasts. We assign 1 to those forecasts issued on the day and one day after
quarter t earnings announcement date (the two-day window), and 0 to remaining forecasts. The mean (median) value of this interval is 100 (98)
days.
9 This measure does not build on the assumption that an analyst accesses peer estimates or that he puts a weight on peer estimates. Earnings
forecast accuracy is the distance between the forecasted earnings and actual realized earnings. If one earnings forecast shortens (prolongs) this
distance compared with the prior forecast, we assign 1 (0) to the variable ACCURACY. This variable is only defined for forecasts issued on or one day
after earnings announcement dates. This definition is advantageous since it removes analyst-firm paired fixed effects.
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total market capitalization plus the book value of total debt deflated by the book value of total assets. SALES_GROWTH is quarter-to-
quarter sales revenue difference deflated by the sales revenue for the same quarter last year. ROA equals net profit divided by total
assets. LOSS equals 1 if ROA is< 0, otherwise 0. SUE is the change in net profit from quarter-to-quarter net profit deflated by the
market capitalization on the day before the earnings announcement date.10TRVOL is the average trading volume over the [−1,+1]
window of the three prior earnings announcement dates, scaled by the average trading volume in the non-earnings announcement
days for the same three quarters. RETVAR is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the [−1,+1] window of the three
earnings announcement dates minus the standard deviation of daily stock returns over non-earnings announcement days for the same
three quarters. We cluster by firm to correct for firm-level correlation.11 Given that prior research documents a strong association
between forecast horizon and analyst forecast accuracy, we also include DAYS and forecast period fixed effects (FPI) when the
dependent variable is ACCURACY. Specifically, DAYS is the number of days between the analyst forecast revision date and the
forecast period end date. FPI denotes the accounting period for which an earnings forecast is made. For example, FPI equal to 0 (1)
represents that the earnings revision is made for the current (next) accounting period.
To test the effects of air pollution level on the propensity of analysts to issue bold forecasts during the high pollution period, we
estimate a linear probability model:
= + + + + + + +BOLD NEG BOLD POS BOLD LOG AQI X QTR FPI[ , _ , _ ] _ t0 1 j q (2)
Fig. 1 depicts the timeline to construct the three dependent variables in model (2). Before revising earnings forecasts in response
to earnings announcements, an analyst may have two reference estimates to start with: 1) his own most recent forecast, and 2) the
consensus forecasts issued by all peer analysts in the year preceding his forecast revision (constructed using all peer analysts' latest
forecasts). To address the potential for stale information contained in the two reference estimates, we require that the analyst's prior
forecast and the peer consensus forecast must be issued within one year preceding earnings announcements. Following Clement and
Tse (2005), we define BOLD as 1 if an analyst revises his forecast below or above both reference estimates, 0 otherwise. NEG_BOLD
equals 1 if the analyst's revised earnings forecast is below his own prior forecast and peer consensus forecasts, otherwise 0. POS_BOLD
equals 1 if the analyst's revised earnings forecast is above his own prior forecast and peer consensus forecasts, otherwise 0. All control
variables have been previously defined. To be consistent with H2a and H2b, we expect negative α1s when the dependent variables are
BOLD and NEG_BOLD, respectively.
4.2. Data source
4.2.1. Analyst location
We extract the list of analyst names recorded at the end of each reporting date by CSMAR for all brokers in China. We search each
analyst name in the HUIBO terminal (http://www.hibor.com.cn) to find all analyst reports issued by the analyst.12 These reports
include office landline phone numbers. The first three/four digits of landline phone numbers are area codes, which can be used to
identify the analyst's location (city). Given that each analyst issues multiple forecast reports in a year, it is difficult for us to search
each single analyst report. Instead, we assign the opening and closing dates for each analyst as the 1st of January and 31st December
respectively. In each year, we search two reports, the one issued after, but closest to, 1st January (early report) and the one issued
before, but closest to, 31st December (late report). We assign the early report to 1st January and the late report to 31st December in
each year and collect the two office landline phone numbers appearing on the two reports. To be included in our analysis, we require
that the analyst-year observations do not exhibit changes in their phone number's area code within a single year.13
4.2.2. Air quality index
We download the daily air quality index (AQI) from the website of Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People's Republic
China (http://www.mep.gov.cn/). The AQI has been archived on this website for major cities in China since 2010. Hourly air quality
data, similar to the data used in previous literature from other countries, is unavailable for China, so we employ daily air quality data
in our study.
4.3. Sampling
We retrieve analyst forecast data from the CSMAR and merge it with quarterly earnings announcements. Based on the forecast
revision date, each firm-quarter-analyst-report-forecast period observation is between the announcement date of quarter t and
quarter t + 1. This process leads to an initial sample of 592,706 firm-quarter-analyst-report-forecast period (254,621 firm-quarter-
analyst-report) observations. We first drop the forecasts for a forecast period issued by an analyst after his first forecast for the same
period that is in response to quarter t earnings announcement (124,091 observations). We delete observations without location
information (149,036 observations) or observations lacking AQI information (80,281 observations). The missing analyst and firm
10We follow a random walk assumption for the earnings generation process (Ball and Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989).
11 When we cluster by firm and analyst or firm and city-quarter, results remain qualitatively the same.
12HUIBO terminal has archived a large volume of analyst reports (more than 1 million) which are widely used by investors in the Chinese market.
13 We drop analysts with changes in phone numbers from our sample is because it is very difficult to determine on which date they changed
location.
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level control variables reduce the sample by 1504 and 30,941 observations respectively. We also drop observations with missing
information in calculating accuracy improvement or boldness (114,450 observations). The resulting sample size comprises 92,403
firm-quarter-analyst-report-forecast period observations, which corresponds to 43,195 firm-quarter-analyst-reports.14 After excluding
914 singletons from the firm-quarter-analyst-report sample, the remaining 42,281 observations are used to test the H1a, consisting of
1982 firms, 1487 analysts, 16,699 firm quarters and 9593 analyst-quarters.15
Within the 92,403 observations, there are 59,640 firm-quarter-analyst-report-forecast period observations generated by analysts
on the day of and one day after earnings announcement dates. We drop 333 singletons, arriving at a final sample of 59,307 ob-
servations, which we use to examine H1b, H2a and H2b. This sample includes 1860 unique firms, 1483 analysts, 12,733 firm-quarter
earnings announcements and 7488 analyst-quarters. Table 1 summarizes the above sampling procedures.
Table 2 describes the distribution of analysts and air pollution across cities. Panel A indicates that analysts in our sample are
spread over 19 cities in China. Shanghai is the location for the largest number of analysts, accounting for 45.12% of our sample, with
Beijing, Shenzhen, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Wuhan also hosting a large number of analysts. The skewed distribution of analysts (a
few cities hosting the majority of analysts) raises two challenges to our research design. First, the analyst level AQImay exhibit strong
positive correlations at the city level, which may downwardly bias the estimated standard errors (Petersen, 2009). To deal with this
challenge, we include analyst fixed effect in our main models to mitigate the city level correlation.16 In addition, later in robustness
tests, we cluster the standard errors by city. Second, a firm-quarter-forecast period observation might be followed by multiple
analysts from the same city. In other words, there is no variation within the firm-quarter-forecast period observation. Lack of such
variation may mean that any observed differences in dependent variables are simply due to differences across firm-quarter ob-
servations. To address this concern, we employ diff-in-diff models by constructing a sample in which each firm-quarter-forecast
period observation is followed by multiple analysts from cities with varying AQI values.
Panel B Table 2 summarizes variation in PM levels in the top 6 cites in China (i.e., Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, Nanjing,
Guangzhou, and Wuhan) during our sample period of 2009–2016. Overall, there is a large degree of variation in the amount of
pollution across the cities where analysts are located. During the six years of our sample period, there are 158 days with AQI between
50 and 100 in all six cities simultaneously; 209 days have a high AQI in only one city. There are only 9 days with AQI index higher
than 100 simultaneously in all six cities, but 701 days with such a high AQI in only one city. During our sample period, there are 435
(1477), 899 (1298), 68 (1254), 697 (1611), 258 (1594), and 800 (1482) days with AQI higher than 100 (higher than 50 but no higher
than 100) in Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Wuhan respectively.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Summary statistics
Table 3, panel A provides summary statistics for the dependent variables in models (1) and (2) and for control variables in model
(1).17 55.52% of analyst forecasts are issued with the two-day window of earnings announcements in China, which is higher than the





Fig. 1. Timeline for the research design.
Notes: This figure presents the timeline for our research design. EAs represent the earnings announcement dates for quarterly earnings. FORE+iq is
analyst i's forecast for year q in response to the earnings announcement of quarter t. FORE−iq is analyst i's latest forecast for year q before the earnings
announcement of quarter t. FORE−iq is the consensus forecast for year q before the earning announcement of quarter t by all analysts except analyst i.
To calculate this consensus forecast, we keep all forecasts for year q issued between the earnings announcement of quarter t-4 and that of quarter t. If
the analyst issues multiple forecasts during this period for year q, we retain only the latest forecast.
14 Similar to in the US, analysts in China issue several period forecasts in one report.
15 Correia (2015) shows that the existence of singletons may bias estimation of standard errors. Singleton groups refers to groups with only one
observation. In our setting, adding analyst fixed effects when there is an analyst with only one observation can lead to over-stated significance of the
coefficients.
16 We do not cluster standard errors by city in our main research design is because the number of cities is too small (lower than 40) to correct the
correlation within cities according to Petersen (2009).
17 We do not tabulate the summary statistics for control variables in model (2) is because they are not materially different those reported for model
(1).
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other peer consensus forecasts for 49.57% of the forecasts, which is much lower than the ratio reported by Clement and Tse (2005) in
the US. Most of the bold forecasts (0.3182/0.4957=64%) are negatively bold, in which analysts downwardly revise their forecasts.
Relative to analysts' immediately prior forecast, fewer than half (mean of ACCURACY=45.41%) of the forecasts provided in a short







Analyst forecasts merged with the quarterly earnings announcement dates (forecast period
end between 31/12/2010–31/12/2016)
592,706 254,621
Less: forecasts issued after an analyst's first revision in response to the current quarter earnings
announcement
124,091 51,330
Less: observations without location information 149,036 73,550
Less: observations without air quality information 80,281 30,927
Less: observations without analyst level control variables 1504 574
Less: observations without firm level control variables 30,941 12,568
Less: observations without accuracy improvement/boldness measure 114,450 42,477
Remaining forecasts issued between two quarterly announcements 92,403 43,195
Forecasts issued on and one day after earnings announcement dates 59,640
Less: singletons 333 914
Remaining forecasts 59,307 42,281
Firm observations 1860 1982
Firm quarter announcements 12,733 16,699
Analyst observations 1484 1487
Analyst quarter observation 7488 9593
Table 2
Statistics of the variation in analysts and AQIacross locations.
Panel A Location distribution of analysts in our sample.
City No. of observations % of observations City No. of observations % of observations
Beijing 496 29.07 Shanghai 770 45.13
Changsha 11 0.64 Shenzhen 262 15.36
Dalian 2 0.12 Suzhou 6 0.35
Dongguan 8 0.47 Taiyuan 8 0.47
Guangzhou 24 1.41 Tianjin 12 0.70
Hangzhou 5 0.29 Wuxi 13 0.76
Hefei 4 0.23 Wuhan 15 0.88
Jinan 2 0.12 Xian 3 0.18
Nanjing 51 2.99 Chongqing 13 0.76
Nanning 1 0.06 Total 1706 100
Panel B Statistics of extreme event days with high AQIacross top 6 cities during the period of 2009–2016 in China.
50 < AQI≤ 100 AQI > 100
# Days in 6 cities 158 9
# Days in 5 cities 393 57
# Days in 4 cities 659 123
# Days in 3 cities 649 271
# Days in 2 cities 459 394
# Days in 1 city 209 701
# Days in Shanghai 1477 435
# Days in Beijing 1298 899
# Days in Shenzhen 1254 68
# Days in Nanjing 1611 697
# Days in Guangzhou 1594 258
# Days in Wuhan 1482 800
Panel A of this table displays the location distribution of analysts in our sample observations. Panel B presents the numbers of extreme event days
with high AQIduring our sample period of 2009–2016 across top 6 cities in terms of the number of analysts in China.
18 In our sample, analysts do not update their forecasts for 30.08% of their available opportunities. Taken together, on average analysts increase
their forecast accuracy over time.
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67, which is highly comparable to those reported by Li et al., 2019, although those papers cover a slightly different period.19
Regarding control variables, a representative Chinese analyst follows 12 firms and 3 industries, which is lower than his peers in
the U.S. (Clement and Tse, 2005). On average, a brokerage employs 37 (e3.6204) analysts. Each firm-year observation has an average
following of 17 analysts. Mean and median EXP are 17 and 18 quarters respectively. 26% forecasts are issued by star analysts. Mean
TRVOL is 16% higher during earnings announcement periods than during non-earnings announcement days. However, stock return
volatility (RETVAR) does not appear to be affected by earnings announcements. 18.66% of earnings announcements are related to
annual earnings. The fraction of loss firms is only 2.95%, which is much lower than in the U.S.
Table 3, panel B presents the mean statistics for all four dependent variables across LOG_AQI quintiles, with quintile 0 (1)
representing the lowest (highest) PM pollution periods. There is a generally declining trend for each of the four variables from the
least to most polluted periods.20 For instance, 62.10% of analyst forecasts are issued within the two-day window of earnings an-
nouncements in the least polluted period, whereas this percentage drops to only 48.05% in the most polluted period. Compared with
the lowest AQI quintile, where 48.35% of analyst forecasts experience improvement in accuracy; accuracy improvements for analysts
in the highest AQI quintile are much lower (44.36%). Mean BOLD and NEG_BOLD are 52.70% (48.06%) and 34.71% (29.93%) in the
lowest (highest) AQI quintile respectively. Positively bold forecasts do not show a similar pattern, however, with no discernable
Table 3
Summary statistics.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for all variables
Variables Mean Std. P25 P50 P75 N
TL 0.5552 0.4970 0 1 1 42,281
ACCURACY 0.4551 0.4980 0 0 1 59,307
BOLD 0.4957 0.5000 0 0 1 59,307
NEG_BOLD 0.3182 0.4658 0 0 1 59,307
POS_BOLD 0.1774 0.3821 0 0 0 59,307
AQI 76.6295 39.9647 52 67 91 42,281
LOG_AQI 4.2286 0.4623 3.9512 4.2047 4.5109 42,281
N_FIRM 2.2845 0.8023 1.7918 2.3026 2.8332 42,281
N_IND 1.2226 0.4825 0.6931 1.0986 1.6094 42,281
SIZE_BROKER 3.6204 0.5388 3.3322 3.6889 3.9703 42,281
EXP 2.8090 0.6464 2.4849 2.8904 3.2958 42,281
N_FOLLOW 2.8549 0.6380 2.4849 2.9444 3.3322 42,281
STAR 0.2564 0.4366 0 0 1 42,281
DAYS 6.0842 0.6168 5.5053 6.2500 6.5944 59,307
HOLDPERCT 0.0637 0.0748 0.0074 0.0364 0.0933 42,281
ROA 0.0440 0.0400 0.0145 0.0334 0.0626 42,281
LEV 0.4584 0.2271 0.2776 0.4510 0.6264 42,281
SALES_GROWTH 0.2875 0.4579 0.0608 0.2022 0.3846 42,281
TRVOL 1.1633 0.3254 0.9396 1.1200 1.3388 42,281
RETVAR 0.0012 0.0091 −0.0044 0.0007 0.0067 42,281
MB 2.7472 1.8728 1.3870 2.1779 3.4588 42,281
SUE 0.0046 0.0174 0.0002 0.0035 0.0092 42,281
SIZE 16.4226 1.1397 15.6016 16.2346 17.0745 42,281
ANNUAL 0.1866 0.3896 0 0 0 42,281
LOSS 0.0295 0.1692 0 0 0 42,281
WIND 2.0014 2.0504 0 2 4 37,499
CLOUD_RAIN 0.5946 0.4910 0 1 1 37,507
Panel B: Forecast timeliness, boldness and accuracy improvement across AQIquintiles
AQI quintile Mean_LOG_AQI TL ACCURACY BOLD NEG_BOLD POS_BOLD
0 3.5927 0.6210 0.4835 0.5270 0.3471 0.1799
1 4.0103 0.5535 0.4656 0.5109 0.3344 0.1765
2 4.2058 0.5854 0.4474 0.4928 0.3157 0.1771
3 4.4404 0.5355 0.4355 0.4670 0.2947 0.1723
4 4.8938 0.4805 0.4436 0.4806 0.2993 0.1813
Q4-Q0 −0.1405⁎ −0.0399⁎⁎⁎ −0.0464⁎⁎⁎ −0.0478⁎⁎⁎ 0.0014
t-statistic −18.5567 −6.1629 −7.1492 −7.8810 0.2869
Panel A of this table presents summary statistics of all variables used in the paper. Panel B presents the means of all four dependent variables across
AQIquintiles, with quintile 0 (1) representing the lowest (highest) PM pollution observations. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎ represent statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. See the appendix for variable definitions.
19 Mean and median AQI in Li et al. (2019) are 80 and 70 respectively.
20 The generally monotonic trend provides support for our linear model specification.
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differences in their incidence across AQI quintiles. The differences in TL, ACCURACY, BOLD and NEG_BOLD between the lowest and
highest quintiles are significant, not only statistically (all with p < .0001) but also economically, with a difference from the mean
between the extreme quintiles of 14%, 4%, 5%, and 5% respectively.
5.2. Multivariate regression results
5.2.1. Air pollution and analyst forecast properties
Table 4 reports results for estimating model (1) where we examine how PM pollution affects the timeliness and accuracy of
analyst forecasts. Column (1) Panel A presents the base model, which does not include any control variables or fixed effects. For this
model, the coefficient of LOG_AQI is −0.0975 and is highly significant (p < .0001). The model reported in column (2) includes firm,
year and quarter fixed effects. In column (3), we include additional control variables. Column (4) presents results where we remove
the effects of analyst invariant characteristics (e.g., gender and education background). None of these additions results in large
changes to the coefficient of LOG_AQI and the coefficients are all highly significant (p < .0001). In column (5), when we control for
weather effects, the coefficient of LOG_AQI remains negative and significant. All models provide results consistent with the level of
PM pollution being significantly negatively associated with analysts' propensity to issue forecasts within the two-day window of
earnings announcements. The coefficients of the two weather related variables suggest that bad weather is negatively related to
analysts' likelihood to revise earnings forecasts immediately after earnings announcements, which is consistent with the findings in
prior literature (DeHaan et al., 2017), but does not affect our inferences regarding air pollution.
Our results are economically significant. Based upon the magnitude of the coefficients of all independent variables reported in
column (5) of Panel A, we first set LOG_AQI to its 75th percentile value, other continuous variables to their mean values and all
indicator values to be zeros. The estimated baseline probability of issuing timely forecasts is 62.32%. When we change the LOG_AQI
to its 25th percentile value and keep all other variables constant, the re-estimated probability of issuing timely forecasts becomes
68.42%. As a result, an increase in LOG_AQI from its first to third quartile leads to a 6.10% (68.42%‐62.32%) decrease in the
probability of issuing timely forecasts (TL). In contrast, an increase inWIND from its first to third quartile leads to a 0.60% decrease in
the probability of issuing timely forecasts. The coefficient of CLOUD_RAIN indicates that compared with a sunny day, analysts are
11.25% less likely to issue a timely forecast revision on a cloudy/rainy day. We note that these results are not exactly comparable,
since CLOUD_RAIN is a dichotomous variable and AQI is continuous.21 Overall, we find evidence supportive of H1a, that high PM
pollution reduces analysts’ propensity to issue timely forecasts. More importantly, this effect is distinct from the previously docu-
mented weather effect.
Turning to the control variables, broker size, the number of analysts following the firm, the number of firms followed by the
analyst, firm profitability and firm size are positively associated with timely forecasts. Leverage, earnings surprise, and growth
prospects are negatively associated with timely forecasts.
Panel B of Table 4 provides evidence consistent with H1b, that analysts are less likely to improve their forecast accuracy in periods
with high PM pollution. As before, we first report a model excluding controls and then add different levels of control variables. Across
all models, the coefficient of ACCURACY is negative and statistically significant. Analyst coverage, firm size, earning surprise, and
firm growth prospect are negatively associated with analyst tendency to improve their forecast accuracy. Analyst experience, analyst
following, and early forecasts are positively associated with the presence of improvement in forecast accuracy. These results are
robust to analyst fixed effects and weather-related variables. In particular, we fail to find significant results for either weather-related
variable, suggesting that weather conditions do not affect improvements in forecast accuracy. Following the aforementioned ap-
proach, the estimated baseline probability of experiencing improvement in forecast accuracy is 46.11%. When we decrease the
LOG_AQI from its 75th to 25th percentile value, the probability increases to 48.63%.
5.2.2. Air pollution and analyst information production
Table 5 presents the results of estimating model (2) for our tests of H2a, that there is a negative association between PM pollution
and forecast boldness for forecast revisions issued within a short window after earnings announcements. Panel A presents results for
BOLD as the dependent variable. As before, we first estimate the models without control variables and in consecutive models, add
different types of control variables. In all cases, the coefficient of LOG_AQI is negative and significant. Column (3) reports results
including firm fixed effects, where the coefficient of LOG_AQI is ‐0.0169 (p <0.05). Further results indicate that analysts with wide
coverage are less likely to issue bold forecasts. Analyst experience, analyst following, and early forecasts (relative to the forecast
period end) are positively associated with the presence of bold forecasts. Firm size, earnings surprise, growth prospect, and in-
stitutional shareholdings all exhibit negative associations with the presence of bold forecasts. These results are robust to inclusion of
both analyst fixed effects and weather-related control variables (reported in column (5)). With respect to economic significance, an
increase in LOG_AQI from the first to the third quartile results in a 3% decrease in the proportion of forecasts that are bold.22 Results
fail to provide evidence that weather conditions are associated with analyst forecast boldness around earnings announcements.
21 The coefficient of the dichotomous variable CLOUD_RAINmay be driven by the effect of extreme poor weather days. If we treat CLOUD_RAIN as
a ‘continuous’ variable and assess the economic effects, one standard deviation change in CLOUD_RAIN triggers 11.11% standard deviation change
in TL. As a result, we interpret the effect of air pollution to be as large as that of weather in affecting analysts’ issuance of timely forecasts.
22 When we investigate the relation between accuracy and boldness of forecasts, we find that air pollution not only directly reduces the likelihood
of bold forecasts, but, also impairs the accuracy of the bold forecasts.
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Table 4
Impact of air pollution on analyst forecast timeliness and accuracy.
Panel A AQIand timeliness of analyst forecasts (H1a)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TL TL TL TL TL
LOG_AQI −0.0975⁎⁎⁎ −0.0894⁎⁎⁎ −0.0868⁎⁎⁎ −0.0966⁎⁎⁎ −0.1095⁎⁎⁎
(−16.89) (−14.28) (−13.77) (−14.63) (−15.05)
LOG_N_FIRM 0.0490⁎⁎⁎ 0.0622⁎⁎⁎ 0.0542⁎⁎⁎
(9.05) (8.44) (6.71)
LOG_N_IND −0.0112 0.0115 0.0100
(−1.18) (0.93) (0.74)
LOG_SIZE_BROKER 0.0309⁎⁎⁎ 0.0269⁎⁎ −0.0115
(5.78) (1.99) (−0.79)
LOG_EXP −0.0057 0.0492⁎⁎⁎ 0.0372⁎
(−1.31) (2.70) (1.92)
LOG_N_FOLLOW 0.0272⁎⁎⁎ 0.0295⁎⁎⁎ 0.0280⁎⁎⁎
(2.88) (4.50) (4.20)
STAR −0.0064 −0.0337⁎⁎⁎ −0.0408⁎⁎⁎
(−0.95) (−2.65) (−2.94)
HOLDPERCT 0.0363 0.0443 −0.0119
(0.50) (0.83) (−0.21)
ROA 0.3527⁎⁎ 0.2538⁎⁎ 0.1818
(2.12) (2.12) (1.43)
LEV −0.1347⁎⁎⁎ −0.0394⁎ −0.0373⁎
(−3.13) (−1.84) (−1.73)
SALES_GROWTH 0.0018 0.0114⁎ 0.0161⁎⁎
(0.22) (1.88) (2.48)
LOSS −0.0006 −0.0215 −0.0266
(−0.03) (−1.28) (−1.53)
SUE −0.7189⁎⁎⁎ −0.3998⁎⁎ −0.5149⁎⁎
(−3.58) (−2.15) (−2.43)
SIZE 0.0707⁎⁎⁎ −0.0032 −0.0017
(5.55) (−0.67) (−0.35)
MB −0.0218⁎⁎⁎ −0.0030 −0.0033
(−5.25) (−1.31) (−1.38)
TRVOL 0.0159 0.0016 −0.0048
(1.42) (0.16) (−0.45)






Observations 42,281 42,281 42,281 42,281 37,465
Year 2010–2016 2010–2016 2010–2016 2010–2016 2010–2016
R-squared 0.008 0.138 0.145 0.217 0.235
Firm FE NO YES YES NO NO
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE NO YES YES YES YES
Analyst FE YES YES
Panel B AQIand analyst forecast accuracy (H1b).
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ACCURACY ACCURACY ACCURACY ACCURACY ACCURACY
LOG_AQI −0.0340⁎⁎⁎ −0.0212⁎⁎⁎ −0.0216⁎⁎⁎ −0.0175⁎⁎ −0.0246⁎⁎⁎
(−5.42) (−3.16) (−3.21) (−2.31) (−2.94)
LOG_N_FIRM −0.0110⁎⁎ −0.0315⁎⁎⁎ −0.0340⁎⁎⁎
(−1.96) (−3.52) (−3.49)
LOG_N_IND −0.0086 −0.0033 −0.0014
(−0.88) (−0.22) (−0.09)
LOG_SIZE_BROKER −0.0007 −0.0225 −0.0330⁎
(−0.12) (−1.41) (−1.95)
LOG_EXP 0.0120⁎⁎⁎ 0.0423⁎⁎ 0.0537⁎⁎
(2.63) (1.97) (2.12)
LOG_N_FOLLOW 0.0536⁎⁎⁎ 0.0149⁎⁎ 0.0117
(continued on next page)
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To provide evidence regarding H2b, that PM pollution has a larger effect on negatively bold rather than positively bold forecasts,
we estimate Equation (2) by using NEG_BOLD and POS_BOLD as dependent variables. Panel B and panel C of Table 5 tabulate the
results. The tables present results only for LOG_AQI, which is the variable of interest.23 Similar to panel A, we include additional
controls across the models reported in each panel. Results are consistent across all models. Focusing on column (4), the model with
analyst fixed effects, results reported in panel B for negatively bold forecasts indicate a negative coefficient of LOG_AQI (‐0.0204,
p <0.01), whereas in the same model, but for positively bold forecasts, column (4) in panel C reports a positive but insignificant
coefficient of LOG_AQI (0.0052, p >0.1). The economic significance of the coefficient of LOG_AQI is column (4) panel B suggests that
an increase in LOG_AQI from its first to third quartile value leads to a 5% decrease in the proportion of forecasts that are negatively
bold. When we compare the coefficients of LOG_AQI between columns (4) of Panel B and C, the difference is significant with
p <0.01. The difference in the two coefficients provides evidence that the negative effect of PM pollution on analysts’ tendency to
issue bold forecasts manifests in the effect of PM pollution on negatively bold forecasts.
Table 4 (continued)
Panel B AQIand analyst forecast accuracy (H1b).
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ACCURACY ACCURACY ACCURACY ACCURACY ACCURACY
(4.65) (2.01) (1.46)
STAR 0.0031 −0.0262⁎ −0.0331⁎
(0.46) (−1.74) (−1.93)
LOG_DAYS 0.0525⁎⁎⁎ 0.0658⁎⁎⁎ 0.0831⁎⁎⁎
(3.31) (4.04) (4.74)
HOLDPERCT −0.1133 −0.2026⁎⁎⁎ −0.2039⁎⁎⁎
(−1.54) (−3.63) (−3.31)
ROA −0.0777 −0.0379 0.0094
(−0.40) (−0.27) (0.06)
LEV 0.0220 0.0012 −0.0048
(0.43) (0.05) (−0.19)
SALES_GROWTH −0.0306⁎⁎⁎ −0.0248⁎⁎⁎ −0.0309⁎⁎⁎
(−3.03) (−3.12) (−3.43)
LOSS −0.0764⁎⁎⁎ −0.0386⁎ ‐0.0394⁎
(‐2.67) (‐1.77) (‐1.78)
SUE ‐2.4288⁎⁎⁎ ‐2.7268⁎⁎⁎ ‐2.9866⁎⁎⁎
(‐8.75) (‐11.07) (‐11.18)
SIZE ‐0.0541⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0042 ‐0.0052
(‐3.41) (‐0.98) (‐1.12)
MB ‐0.0210⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0126⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0118⁎⁎⁎
(‐3.39) (‐4.29) (‐3.78)
TRVOL 0.0049 0.0057 0.0169
(0.35) (0.48) (1.35)






Observations 59,307 59,307 59,307 59,307 51,828
Year 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016
R-squared 0.001 0.114 0.125 0.151 0.159
Firm FE NO YES YES NO NO
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE NO YES YES YES YES
FPI FE NO YES YES YES YES
Analyst FE YES YES
This table presents OLS regression results using TL and ACCURACY as the dependent variable in Panel A and B respectively. In all regression models,
we log transform AQI, and all continuous analyst level control variables. In column (1), we do not control any variables or fixed effects. In column
(2), we add firm, year and quarter fixed effects to the model. Column (3) presents the full model where we further control both analyst and firm level
control variables. In column (4), we replace firm fixed effects with analyst fixed effects. In column (5), we further control for local weather
conditions. All standard errors are corrected for firm level correlation. The sample period spans 2010‐2016. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎ represent statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. See the appendix for variable definitions.
23 Complete results are available from the authors.
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Table 5
Boldness as a channel underlying the impact of air pollution on analyst forecasts
Panel A Air pollution and forecast boldness
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BOLD BOLD BOLD BOLD BOLD
LOG_AQI ‐0.0385⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0152⁎⁎ ‐0.0169⁎⁎ ‐0.0151⁎⁎ ‐0.0183⁎⁎
(‐5.95) (‐2.21) (‐2.49) (‐2.00) (‐2.20)
LOG_N_FIRM ‐0.0178⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0487⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0544⁎⁎⁎
(‐3.05) (‐5.39) (‐5.48)
LOG_N_IND ‐0.0082 0.0047 0.0089
(‐0.78) (0.32) (0.53)
LOG_SIZE_BROKER ‐0.0030 ‐0.0194 ‐0.0312⁎
(‐0.48) (‐1.21) (‐1.80)
LOG_EXP 0.0099⁎⁎ 0.0522⁎⁎ 0.0516⁎⁎
(2.15) (2.57) (2.16)
LOG_N_FOLLOW 0.0706⁎⁎⁎ 0.0386⁎⁎⁎ 0.0342⁎⁎⁎
(6.06) (5.14) (4.25)
STAR ‐0.0061 ‐0.0174 ‐0.0324⁎
(‐0.82) (‐1.17) (‐1.92)
LOG_DAYS 0.0769⁎⁎⁎ 0.0867⁎⁎⁎ 0.0924⁎⁎⁎
(5.87) (6.26) (6.08)
HOLDPERCT ‐0.1687⁎⁎ ‐0.1504⁎⁎ ‐0.1350⁎
(‐2.37) (‐2.27) (‐1.84)
ROA 0.1956 0.2790⁎⁎ 0.1436
(1.06) (2.02) (0.95)
LEV ‐0.0715 ‐0.0435⁎ ‐0.0517⁎⁎
(‐1.41) (‐1.88) (‐2.17)
SALES_GROWTH 0.0022 0.0090 0.0035
(0.21) (1.14) (0.40)
LOSS 0.0193 0.0202 0.0116
(0.75) (1.00) (0.55)
SUE ‐2.0594⁎⁎⁎ ‐2.3923⁎⁎⁎ ‐2.7359⁎⁎⁎
(‐8.02) (‐10.27) (‐10.69)
SIZE ‐0.0482⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0029 ‐0.0008
(‐3.17) (‐0.64) (‐0.16)
MB ‐0.0145⁎⁎ ‐0.0158⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0153⁎⁎⁎
(‐2.55) (‐5.00) (‐4.59)
TRVOL 0.0054 0.0068 0.0051
(0.43) (0.64) (0.44)






Observations 59,307 59,307 59,307 59,307 51,828
Year 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016
R-squared 0.001 0.126 0.134 0.174 0.183
Firm FE NO YES YES NO NO
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE NO YES YES YES YES
FPI FE NO YES YES YES YES
Analyst FE YES YES
Panel B: Air pollution and negative boldness
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEG_BOLD NEG_BOLD NEG_BOLD NEG_BOLD NEG_BOLD
LOG_AQI ‐0.0354⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0205⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0226⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0204⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0286⁎⁎⁎
(‐4.93) (‐2.91) (‐3.40) (‐2.75) (‐3.46)
CONTROLS NO NO YES YES YES
Observations 59,307 59,307 59,307 59,307 51,828
Year 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016
R-squared 0.001 0.159 0.204 0.219 0.229
Firm FE NO YES YES NO NO
(continued on next page)
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5.3. Difference-in-differences designs
In our setting, there is potential existence of correlated omitted variables that might explain our results. For example, migration
economics suggests that people with high ability have more choices about where they work (Chiswick, 1999; Chiquiar and Hanson,
2005). In our setting, if analysts with high ability prefer to work in cities without air pollution, our findings might reflect poorer
performance of low ability analysts working in polluted cities. To a certain extent, our battery of analyst attributes and analyst fixed
effects address this issue. However, to provide further confidence in our results, we further employ diff-in-diff empirical designs.
Following Li et al., 2019, to reduce the threat of analyst migration in response to air pollution, we take advantage of exogenous
short-term stark changes in air quality in the cities where analysts are located. Specifically, we identify analyst-firm-announcement
quarter observations for which there were drastic differences in air quality during the short-window forecasting periods between two
adjacent quarters (the treatment sample). To be included in this sample, the difference in AQI of two adjacent quarter analyst-firm
forecasts must be at least 40 (one standard deviation of our full sample AQI). Conceptually, within this sample, an analyst-firm
forecast potentially receives two types of treatment, one where there is an increase in AQI (polluted) and the other one where there is
a decrease in AQI (clean). Once we identify treatment observations, the change in the timeliness and properties of analyst forecasts
between the two earnings announcements should reflect the effect of the difference in air quality.
Given that the timeliness and earnings forecasts properties in our study also change in relation to other analyst‐/firm-level
characteristics (e.g., analyst experience), we construct a control sample to control for the effects of these characteristics on the
dependent variables. For each observation in the treatment sample, we choose one observation from the remaining observations that
did not experience drastic changes in AQI. The observation chosen must include forecasts issued by an analyst from a different city
but following the same firm. This eliminates concerns about firm-level omitted variables driving our findings. For treatment sample
observations with multiple control observations, we drop those observations with fundamentally different AQI (the difference in AQI
must be less than 30) in the prior earnings announcement quarter. If there is still more than one control observation left, we choose
the observation with the closest AQI across quarters. This process ensures that all changes between the prior and current quarter
timeliness and forecast performance of the control sample should result from changes in analyst‐/firm-level characteristics other than
changes in AQI. The construction of the diff-in-diff design sample also mitigates concerns arising from the skewed distribution of
analysts across cities (i.e. a few cities host the majority of analysts).
To assess the effect of PM pollution on our dependent variables, we compare differences in changes in forecasts of the treatment
sample and changes in forecasts of the control sample between the prior and current quarter earnings announcements. For polluted
Table 5 (continued)
Panel B: Air pollution and negative boldness
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEG_BOLD NEG_BOLD NEG_BOLD NEG_BOLD NEG_BOLD
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE NO YES YES YES YES
FPI FE NO YES YES YES YES
Analyst FE YES YES
Panel C: Air pollution and positive boldness
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POS_BOLD POS_BOLD POS_BOLD POS_BOLD POS_BOLD
LOG_AQI ‐0.0031 0.0053 0.0057 0.0052 0.0103
(‐0.55) (0.96) (1.04) (0.85) (1.60)
CONTROLS NO NO YES YES YES
Observations 59,307 59,307 59,307 59,307 51,828
Year 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016
R-squared 0.000 0.141 0.166 0.191 0.175
Firm FE NO YES YES NO NO
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE NO YES YES YES YES
FPI FE NO YES YES YES YES
Analyst FE YES YES
Panel A, Panel B and Panel C presents OLS regression results using BOLD, NEG_BOLD, and POS_BOLD as dependent variables, respectively. In all
regression models, we log transform AQI, and all continuous analyst level control variables. In column (1), we do not control any variables or fixed
effects. In column (2), we add firm, year, quarter, and the forecast period fixed effects to the model. Column (3) presents the full model where we
further control both analyst and firm level control variables. In column (4), we replace firm fixed effects with analyst fixed effects. In column (5), we
further control for local weather conditions. All standard errors are corrected for firm level correlation. The sample period spans 2010‐2016. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. See the appendix for variable definitions.
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(clean) observations, we should witness a decrease (increase) in timeliness, forecast accuracy improvement, boldness, and negative
boldness. The diff-in-diff model is specified as follows:
= + + + + +
+ + + +
TL ACCURACY BOLD NEG BOLD POLLUTED CLEAN POST POLLUTED POST CLEAN
POST X
[ , , _ ] 0 1 2 3 4 5
j q (3)
where POLLUTED (CLEAN) equals 1 if an analyst-firm observation experiences an increase (decrease) in AQI from the previous
quarter forecast, otherwise 0. POST equals 1(0) for the current (previous) quarter forecast. To be consistent with our hypotheses, we
should find negative α4s and/or positive α5s.
Table 6, panels A and B provide summary statistics for our main variables used in the diff-in-diff analysis. Panel A shows changes
in both AQI and TL across firms between the preceding and current quarter announcements. There are 2,762, 910, and 1,852 analyst-
firm observations in the Control, Clean, and Polluted samples respectively. Consistent with our sampling strategy, AQI for the Control
sample does not differ across periods, whereas the Clean (Polluted) sample has a significantly negative (positive) change in AQI across
periods. Results across the samples for TL are consistent with our earlier results. While there is an insignificant difference in TL across
periods for the Control sample, there is a decrease (increase) of 12.09% (3.46%) in TL in the Clean (Polluted) sample, which is
consistent with the changes in AQI experienced across the samples.
Table 6, panel B provides a similar univariate analysis, but focuses on forecast accuracy, boldness, and negative boldness. For
these analyses, there are 1,316, 421 and 881 observations in the Control, Clean, and Polluted samples respectively. In the Clean
(Polluted) sample, ACCURACY increases (decreases) by 11.98% (1.5%) across quarters, BOLD increases (decreases) by 6.07%
(3.41%), and NEG_BOLD increases (decreases) by 10.39% (1.5%). Although not all of these results are statistically significant, the
overall pattern is consistent with our expectations.
Table 6, panel C provides results of estimating model (3), including controls at the firm-level, analyst-level, and fixed effects for
time and firm. In column (1), the coefficients of POLLUTED* POST and CLEAN* POST are consistent with H1a: an (a) increase
(decrease) in AQI leads to less (more) timely earnings forecasts relative to control observations without any change in AQI. The
remaining three columns document significant differences in response to changes in AQI across samples for forecast accuracy,
boldness, and negative boldness.24Analysts experiencing cleaner air demonstrate increased forecast accuracy and analysts experi-
encing polluted environments provide forecasts with decreased boldness and negative boldness. Overall, the diff-in-diff design results
corroborate our previous findings.
5.4. Models to address additional endogeneity concerns
Our models employ local air pollution faced by analysts to capture our variable of interest. This variable is potentially correlated
with other analyst host city (both time invariant and variant) characteristics which we may not have included in our models. In the
next two subsections, we discuss this possibility and our strategies to address these concerns.
5.4.1. Geographic distance between an analyst and the firm followed
Given that a firm might be covered by multiple analysts, the geographic distance between an analyst and the firm covered may
contaminate our analyses. In particular, analysts who are closely located to the covered firm may have advantages in acquiring
private information. These advantages may allow the analyst to issue early, accurate and bold forecasts. This possibility might
compromise our tests if analysts closely located to firms are less affected by air pollution. In extreme circumstances, if only analysts
remotely located to firms are subject to air pollution, then the findings we document might be largely driven by geographic distance.
Our estimated models include analyses with analyst fixed effects, which mitigates this geographic distance effect if analysts and the
firms covered generally do not change their locations. In our data, there is no firm changing headquarters and we have removed
analysts with different area codes in their landline phone numbers within a year. In untabulated analyses, we compute the geographic
distance between analysts and firms covered and include the distance as a control. Our inferences are the same as reported for our
earlier analyses.
5.4.2. Other time-variant characteristics
We conduct two sets of placebo tests to address the concern that our observed results are driven by some unobservable analyst-
city-time variant characteristics or time variant characteristics. Conceptually, in the first test, we randomly substitute the AQI of the
same analyst-firm from a different short-term forecasting window. In the second, we randomly substitute the AQI from another city
during the same short-term forecasting window. The advantage of doing this randomization is that we keep the effects of time variant
characteristics in our data structure. If our findings are mainly driven by air pollution, our observed results should be much stronger
than the effects estimated from these two placebo tests.
Panel A Table 7 reports the results where we randomize the PM pollution measure at the analyst-firm level. For example, take an
analyst who follows a firm for 3 years and issues 12 forecasts in response to the 12 earnings announcements. Given a specific forecast
issued after a given quarter, we randomly choose an AQI measure from other 11 quarters. After this randomization process, we re-
24 When we compare the coefficients of POLLUTED* POST and CLEAN* POST across forecast timeliness, accuracy improvement, boldness, and
negative boldness, the difference is significant with at least p<0.1.




Panel A Summary statistics for change in air pollution and forecast timeliness
Control Clean Polluted
AQI
#observations 2,762 910 1,852
Post=0 66.2730 94.7146 56.9514
post=1 66.8125 41.0637 131.0400
Diff ‐0.5395 53.6528⁎⁎⁎ ‐74.0886⁎⁎⁎
TL
#observations 2,762 910 1,852
Post=0 0.5807 0.5473 0.6026
post=1 0.5873 0.6681 0.5680
Diff ‐0.0065 ‐0.1209⁎⁎⁎ 0.0346⁎
Panel B Summary statistics for change in air pollution and forecast accuracy, boldness and negative boldness
Control Clean Polluted
AQI
#observations 1,316 421 881
Post=0 65.0501 92.7391 55.1044
post=1 65.2207 39.1814 126.5870
Diff ‐0.1706 53.5577⁎⁎⁎ ‐71.4826⁎⁎⁎
ACCURACY
#observations 1,315 421 879
Post=0 0.5502 0.4076 0.4967
post=1 0.5053 0.5274 0.5116
Diff 0.0448⁎ ‐0.1198⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0150
BOLD
#observations 1,315 421 878
Post=0 0.4970 0.4457 0.5737
post=1 0.5449 0.5063 0.5395
Diff ‐0.0479⁎⁎ ‐0.0607 0.0341
NEG_BOLD
#observations 1,315 421 878
Post=0 0.2979 0.2011 0.3638
post=1 0.3379 0.3080 0.3488
Diff ‐0.0400⁎ ‐0.1069⁎⁎⁎ 0.0150
Panel C Multivariate analyses
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
TL ACCURACY BOLD NEG_BOLD
POST 0.0281 ‐0.0230 0.0779⁎⁎ 0.0482
(1.43) (‐0.63) (2.07) (1.60)
POLLUTED×POST ‐0.0463⁎ 0.0520 ‐0.1229⁎⁎ ‐0.0885⁎⁎
(‐1.68) (1.01) (‐2.47) (‐2.18)
CLEAN×POST 0.1090⁎⁎⁎ 0.1573⁎⁎ 0.0358 0.0747
(3.05) (2.37) (0.64) (1.61)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,524 2,615 2,613 2,613
Year 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016
R-squared 0.193 0.248 0.269 0.367
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
This table presents the results of conducting difference-in-differences designs. We first identify treatment sample consisting of analyst-firm-quarter
forecasts experiencing drastic changes (a difference of 40) in AQI between two adjacent quarters. Each pair of treatment observations represent the
same analyst-firm forecasts with different AQIs. POLLUTED (CLEAN) equals 1 if there is an increase (a decrease) in AQI from the preceding to current
quarter. For each treatment observation, we match one control observation where an analyst from a different city follows the same firm over the
same periods. There should not be drastic changes in AQI of control observations between the two quarters. POST equals 1 (0) for the current
(preceding) quarter. All standard errors are corrected for firm level correlation. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level
(two-tailed), respectively. See the appendix for variable definitions.
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estimate Equations (1) and (2), repeating the test 150 times to generate the distribution of coefficients of LOG_AQI.25 Panel A column
(1) reports results of estimating the test for model (1), where TL is the dependent variable. The mean coefficient of LOG_AQI is
‐0.0015, which is only 1.7% of the actual coefficient reported in Table 3 column (3). Results of the placebo tests for estimating model
(2) are similar. The actual coefficients reported in Table 4 panel B for ACCURACY,Table 5 for BOLD, and Table 6 panel B for
NEG_BOLD are below the minimum values of the distributions of coefficients from the placebo tests.
Panel B Table 7 reports results where we randomize analyst location information. For example, we randomly assign an analyst
located in Beijing to another city in China and recalculate the AQI measure from that location. We then estimate our models and
repeat this process 150 times. Although we expect that this randomized city AQI will not elicit the same results as our primary
models, due to the large scale of air pollution in China on a given day, there is a likely a strong positive correlation in the PM
pollution level between any two cities. This strong positive correlation implies that we may still obtain associations between the
randomized AQI measure and our dependent variables. Column (1) indicates that the average coefficients linking randomized AQI to
TL is ‐0.0357. Although not equal to zero, this value is only 41% of our original coefficient, which is in the 0th percentile of the
distribution of false coefficients. In the remaining models, the actual coefficients of ACCURACY, BOLD, and NEG_BOLD reported in
Tables 5 and 6 are in the bottom 5th or better percentile of the distribution of placebo test results. Overall, the results from the both




Coefficient of LOG_AQI (1) (2) (3) (4)
TL ACCURACY BOLD NEG_BOLD
Panel A Randomly assign AQIto an analyst-firm-announcement
Estimated coefficients Table 4 ‐0.0868 ‐0.0216 ‐0.0169 ‐0.0226
Mean ‐0.0015 ‐0.0039 ‐0.0069 ‐0.0063
Standard deviation 0.0043 0.0038 0.0036 0.0019
Minimum ‐0.0114 ‐0.0153 ‐0.0158 ‐0.0150
P1 ‐0.0114 ‐0.0127 ‐0.0156 ‐0.0141
P5 ‐0.0080 ‐0.0096 ‐0.0138 ‐0.0120
P10 ‐0.0071 ‐0.0089 ‐0.0123 ‐0.0108
Max 0.0134 0.0075 0.0036 0.0019
Percentile of coefficient 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample times 150 150 150 150
Avg Observations 42,806 60,046 59,299 59,299
Year 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016
Avg R-squared 0.140 0.126 0.133 0.203
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES
FPI FE YES YES YES
Panel B: Randomly assign city to an individual analyst
Estimated coefficients Table 4 ‐0.0868 ‐0.0216 ‐0.0169 ‐0.0226
Mean ‐0.0357 ‐0.0043 ‐0.0021 ‐0.0030
Standard deviation 0.0075 0.0079 0.0085 0.0079
Minimum ‐0.05460 ‐0.0260 ‐0.0209 ‐0.0224
P1 ‐0.05310 ‐0.0261 ‐0.0205 ‐0.0185
P5 ‐0.04830 ‐0.0180 ‐0.0170 ‐0.0158
P10 ‐0.0444 ‐0.0143 ‐0.0129 ‐0.0140
Max ‐0.0174 0.0210 0.0240 0.0202
Percentile of coefficient 0.00 < 0.05 < 0.06 0.00
Sample times 150 150 150 150
Avg Observations 39,270 55,333 54,648 54,648
Year 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016
Avg R-squared 0.144 0.129 0.136 0.207
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES
FPI FE YES YES YES
This table presents summary statistics for the coefficient of AQI and the fit statistics of models in two placebo tests. The aim of the two placebo tests
is to ensure that the observed effects of air pollution are not driven by some time variant omitted variables. Panel A shows the results where we
randomize the PM pollution measure within an analyst-firm level. Panel B shows results where we randomize the location information for one
analyst. See the appendix for variable definitions.
25 Another advantage of doing such placebo test is that there is no restriction on the (normal) distribution assumption of estimated coefficients.
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5.5. Robustness tests
We conduct a series of robustness tests of our main models. To correct for biased standard errors introduced by city-level AQI
correlations, we cluster standard errors by city. The t-values from this analysis are only marginally different from those reported in
Tables 4 and 5. Our results are also robust to increasing the length of the short window after earnings announcements to [0,2] and
[0,3]. Given that the seasonality may play a role in AQI variation, we expand our models by adding analyst-quarter paired fixed
effects. Results of this analysis are qualitatively similar to those we originally reported. To investigate whether analyst revisions
might be affected by the quality of pre-revision forecasts prior to earnings announcements, we compute accuracy, boldness and
negative boldness measures for pre-revision forecasts in the same way that we develop the measures for models (1) and (2). Results
fail to indicate a systematic association between pre-revision forecast attributes and AQI. Finally, rather than linear probability
models, we estimate models (1) and (2) using probit models with fixed effects. Results continue to be supportive of our hypotheses.
5.6. What factors attenuate the negative effects of air pollution?
While PM pollution affects the timing and quality of analyst forecasts on average, there may be factors that help mitigate pol-
lution’s negative effects. For example, we conjecture that analysts with heavy workload located in high pollution cities are reluctant
to work. If this conjecture holds, we should observe that there are stronger associations between our dependent variables and air
pollution for analysts with higher expected workloads than for those with lower expected workload. We measure analyst workload of
an analyst by counting the number of other earnings announcements made by firms that the analyst followed in the prior quarter
within three days of the focal earnings announcement. Table 8, panel A provides results of this analysis. Results provided in panel A
of Table 8, columns (1) and (2) indicate that the impact of pollution on forecast timeliness is lower for analysts with low workload
versus those with a high workload (p <0.01). Results reported in columns (3) through (8) indicate that the association between PM
pollution and improvement in forecast accuracy, and negatively bold forecasts are primarily driven by analysts with higher work-
loads (at least p <0.05).
Analysts facing greater labor market competition face additional pressure to perform well (Stickel, 1989; Zhang, 2008). If labor
market competition motivates analysts to work hard regardless of environmental conditions, we should observe that competition
mitigates the negative effects of air pollution. To examine this, we partition the sample based on competition among analysts,
measured as the number of analysts following a firm. Panel B Table 8 provides results across this partition. Although competition does
not appear to attenuate the negative association between air pollution and analysts’ likelihood to issue timely forecasts (columns (1)
and (2)), PM pollution has a greater effect on accuracy improvements and negative forecast boldness for analysts facing lower levels
of competition (at least p <0.1).
Finally, prior literature postulates that annual earnings announcements trigger higher trading volume relative to interim an-
nouncements (Griffin, 2003). High trading volume may reflect high information demand from investors, which could mitigate the
negative effects of PM pollution on analyst information production. Table 8, panel C reports results of separating earnings an-
nouncements into annual or quarterly (INTERIM) announcements. While results reported in columns (1) and (2) indicate that PM
pollution impacts the timeliness of forecasts following both annual and quarterly earnings announcements, the impact on quarterly
earnings announcements is significantly greater (p < 0.01). The effect of PM pollution on forecast boldness (both BOLD and
NEG_BOLD) are primarily related to quarterly earnings announcements (at least p < 0.1).
5.7. Market perception of pollution effects on analyst information production
Given the negative effects of air pollution on analyst information production, we investigate whether investors take the reduction
in timeliness and lower quality of analyst forecasts into consideration in market valuations. We examine whether air pollution
preceding issuance of analyst forecasts attenuates the association between share price reactions and forecast revisions. Following
Gleason and Lee (2003), Bonner et al. (2007) and Harford et al. (2018), we estimate the following empirical model:26
= + + × + +CAR REV LOG AQI PRE REV X_ _0 1 2 (4)
where CAR, the cumulative abnormal returns, equals the cumulative daily raw returns over the two days centering on the forecast
revision dates ([0,+1]) minus the cumulative daily value weighted market index returns over the same window with day 0 as the
forecast revision date. If there are more than one forecast revisions on the same day, we divide CAR by the number of forecast
revisions. By doing so, we essentially assume that investors do not price forecast revisions conditional upon air quality leading to
those forecasts. As an alternative, to avoid the overlapping forecast revisions, we follow Gleason and Lee (2003) and re-estimate the
model, keeping only standalone forecasts. REV is the difference between current analyst forecast for year t minus the prior forecast
issued by the same analyst for year t, deflated by closing share price on day ‐1. LOG_AQI_PRE is the natural log of mean AQIpreceding
26 Our model differs from the market reaction model in DeHaan et al. (2017). DeHaan et al. (2017) examine how weather affects investors' pricing
of firm earnings announcements. In their test, they implicitly assume that investors cluster in New York and are affected by the weather in New York
when firms announce earnings. In our test, we do not have this assumption. Instead, we build on our previous findings that air pollution, in analysts'
locations, negatively affects analyst information production and employ model (4) to investigate whether investors perceive the inferior forecasts
issued by analysts exposed to air pollution.
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the forecast revision ([-1,0]). X comprises a series of both firm- and analyst-level variables: 1) SIZE measured as the natural log of
market capitalization on day ‐2; 2)MB equal to market value of equity on day ‐2 divided by book value of equity from the most recent
quarterly report before an analyst forecast; 3) BETA equal to the coefficient of market index returns from a regression of individual
stock returns on market index returns over [‐120,10]; 4) LOG_N_FOLLOW measured as the natural log of one plus the number of
analysts following a firm-year; 5) PAST_RETURN measured as the cumulative abnormal monthly returns over the six month before
forecast revision month; 6) STAR equal to 1 if an analyst became a star in the previous year; 7) LOG_EXP equal to the natural log of
one plus the number of years since an analyst’s first analyst report recorded by the database; 8) LOG_FIRM_EXP equal to the natural
log of one plus the number of years since an analyst’s first analyst report for the firm covered recorded by the database; 9) LOG_N_IND
equal to the natural log of one plus the number of industries followed by an analyst in the prior one year; 10) LOG_DAYS measured as
the natural log of one plus the number of days between an analyst forecast date and the corresponding earnings announcement date;
11) LOG_DIST measured as the natural log of one plus the number of days between the current and previous analyst forecast dates. In
Table 8
What factors attenuate the effects of air pollution?
Panel A The effects of information supply-high vs. low workload
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TL TL ACCURACY ACCURACY BOLD BOLD NEG_BOLD NEG_BOLD
LOW_LOAD HIGH_LOAD LOW_LOAD HIGH_LOAD LOW_LOAD HIGH_LOAD LOW_LOAD HIGH_LOAD
LOG_AQI (α1) ‐0.0627⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.1034⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0122 ‐0.0436⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0108 ‐0.0289⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0119 ‐0.0406⁎⁎⁎
(‐7.05) (‐12.34) (‐1.41) (‐3.24) (‐1.11) (‐2.68) (‐1.27) (‐4.07)
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
α1 between groups (1)‐(2)= ‐0.0407⁎⁎⁎ (3)‐(4)= ‐0.0314⁎⁎ (5)‐(6)= ‐0.0181 (7)‐(8)= ‐0.0287⁎⁎
Observations 22,109 20,172 31,566 27,741 31,566 27,741 31,566 27,741
Year 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016
R-squared 0.176 0.182 0.156 0.175 0.157 0.183 0.236 0.256
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
FPI FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel B The effects of information supply-high vs. low labor market competition
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TL TL ACCURACY ACCURACY BOLD BOLD NEG_BOLD NEG_BOLD
High Low High Low High Low High Low
LOG_AQI ‐0.0894⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0833⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0055 ‐0.0373⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0101 ‐0.0193⁎ ‐0.0129 ‐0.0301⁎⁎⁎
(‐9.66) (‐8.88) (‐0.60) (‐3.65) (‐1.04) (‐1.86) (‐1.38) (‐3.09)
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
α1 between groups (1)‐(2)= ‐0.0061 (3)‐(4)= 0.0318⁎⁎ (5)‐(6)= 0.0092 (7)‐(8)= ‐0.0172⁎
Observations 21,741 20,540 31,327 27,980 31,327 27,980 31,327 27,980
Year 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016
R-squared 0.134 0.192 0.115 0.185 0.124 0.186 0.218 0.246
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
FPI FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel C The effects of information demand-annual vs. interim earnings announcements
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TL TL ACCURACY ACCURACY BOLD BOLD NEG_BOLD NEG_BOLD
ANNUAL INTERIM ANNUAL INTERIM ANNUAL INTERIM ANNUAL INTERIM
LOG_AQI ‐0.0367⁎⁎ ‐0.0985⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0253 ‐0.0166⁎⁎ 0.0136 ‐0.0238⁎⁎⁎ 0.0024 ‐0.0254⁎⁎⁎
(‐2.28) (‐13.76) (‐1.56) (‐2.21) (0.88) (‐3.08) (0.15) (‐3.45)
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
α1 between groups (1)‐(2)= 0.0618⁎⁎⁎ (3)‐(4)= ‐0.0087 (5)‐(6)= 0.0374⁎⁎ (7)‐(8)= 0.0278⁎
Observations 7,891 34,390 10,920 48,387 10,920 48,387 10,920 48,387
Year 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016 2010‐2016
(continued on next page)
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addition, we include firm and year fixed effects in model (4). We cluster the standard errors by forecast revision date to correct for the
cross-correlation in market returns on the same date.
Panel A Table 9 summarizes the sampling process. We first extract the latest forecasts of each analyst issued for year t during
2009‐2016 (87,178 observations). We delete those without preceding forecasts for year t (33,624 observations). To avoid the con-
founding effects of earnings announcements on stock price reactions, we drop those forecasts with quarterly earnings announcements
falling in the window of [‐2,+2] surrounding forecast dates (19,771 observations). We drop 12,805 and 4,615 observations without
analyst location or air quality information. Missing variables further reduces the sample by 2,912. The ultimate sample includes
13,451 analyst-firm-year observations.
Panel B Table 9 tabulates the descriptive statistics of variables in model (4). The mean REV is ‐0.0008, consistent with optimism in
analyst forecasts released early in the year (Gleason and Lee, 2003). The mean value of CAR is positive, suggesting that there might be
a forecast revision premium.
Panel C Table 9 reports results of estimating model (4). Columns (1)‐(3) present results estimated using the full sample and
columns (4)‐(6) present results estimated using standalone forecast revisions. In columns (3) and (6), we expand the model by fully
interacting REV with each of the control variables. Across all models, the coefficients of REV×LOG_AQI_PRE are significantly negative
at least at the 5% level, implying that investors consider the impairment of information provided by analysts due to air pollution.27
6. Conclusion
Many countries experience increasing episodes of severe air pollution, especially PM pollution. Prior studies provide evidence that
air pollution reduces human capital formation and decreases workers’ marginal productivity. Our study extends the literature by
investigating the extent to which PM pollution affects financial analysts’ forecasting behavior.
We find that PM pollution is negatively associated with analysts’ propensity to issue forecasts within a short window following
earnings announcements. Even when they issue forecasts within the short window, analysts exposed to air pollution are unlikely to
improve the accuracy of these forecasts. Further tests indicate that PM pollution reduces the ability of analysts to synthesize in-
formation from earnings announcements. Using forecast boldness to capture analyst information production activities, we find that
analysts forecasting during polluted periods are less likely to make bold, especially, negatively bold forecasts. Several factors appear
to affect the impact of pollution on forecasts. Analysts with high workloads are particularly impacted by pollution. Labor market
competition is also important—analysts who face higher levels of labor market competition appear to compensate for the negative
effects of pollution, whereas analysts who do not face competition do not compensate. High information demand during annual
earnings announcement periods also mitigates the negative effects of air pollution to a certain extent. Finally, we find that market
Table 8 (continued)
Panel C The effects of information demand-annual vs. interim earnings announcements
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TL TL ACCURACY ACCURACY BOLD BOLD NEG_BOLD NEG_BOLD
ANNUAL INTERIM ANNUAL INTERIM ANNUAL INTERIM ANNUAL INTERIM
R-squared 0.219 0.148 0.204 0.135 0.198 0.140 0.347 0.218
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
FPI FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
This table presents OLS regression results where we partition our sample based upon several analyst and firm level variables which may alter the
negative association between AQI and dependent variables. The partitioning variable in Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C is the workload of an analyst,
the competition among analysts following a firm in the previous year, and investor demand for analyst report. The workload is constructed as
follows: given one particular analyst-firm-quarter announcement, we count the number of concurrent earnings announcements made by other firms
followed by the analyst in the prior quarter. For more than half of analyst-firm-quarter announcements, there is no or only one concurrent earnings
announcement. Accordingly, we define LOW_LOAD as those observations with no or one concurrent earnings announcement, with remaining
observations as HIGH_LOAD. The competition among analysts is measured as the number of analysts following the firm-quarter in the previous year.
The investor demand for analyst reports is measured as a dummy variable indicating whether an earnings announcement is annual or interim. In all
regression models, we log transform AQI, and all continuous analyst level control variables, and add firm, year and quarter fixed effects. We further
add the forecast period fixed effects (FPI) when taking ACCURACY, BOLD or NEG_BOLD as the dependent variable. All standard errors are clustered
by firm. The sample period spans 2010‐2016. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. See the
appendix for variable definitions.
27 After controlling for the two-way interaction between REV and BOLD, there is a slight decrease in the coefficient of the two-way interaction
between REV and LOG_AQI_PRE (to 0.0797 with a t-statistic of 1.87) in column (3). Our results show that after controlling for analyst revision
attributes, air pollution still attenuates the market response to analyst revisions. Further (untabled) analysis suggests that forecasts released by
analysts located in high-pollution periods only trigger about 2/3 of the market response to forecasts released by other analysts.
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Table 9
Market perception of the negative effect of air pollution on analyst information production
Panel A Sampling process
# Obs
The latest analyst forecasts issued for the current year from 2009 to 2016 87,178
Less: those without preceding forecasts for a firm-year issued by the same analyst (33,624)
Less: forecasts with quarterly earnings announcements falling in the window of [‐2, +2] surrounding a forecast revision date (19,771)
Less: forecasts without analyst location information (12,805)
Less: forecasts without air pollution information (4,615)
Less: observation with missing variables (2,912)
Overall sample 13,451
Panel B Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Sd P25 P50 P75 N
CAR 0.0081 0.0347 ‐0.0105 0.0040 0.0223 13,451
REV ‐0.0008 0.0095 ‐0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 13,451
LOG_AQI_PRE 4.3480 0.4670 4.0160 4.2840 4.6200 13,451
SIZE 23.2100 1.0020 22.5000 23.0900 23.8200 13,451
MB 3.6210 3.7870 1.2510 2.5190 4.5420 13,451
PAST_RET 0.0997 0.2790 ‐0.0834 0.0596 0.2350 13,451
STAR 0.2850 0.4520 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 13,451
BETA 1.1190 0.3190 0.9040 1.1330 1.3370 13,451
LOG_N_FOLLOW 1.9700 0.6440 1.6090 1.9460 2.4850 13,451
LOG_EXP 1.5940 0.5540 1.3860 1.6090 1.9460 13,451
LOG_FIRM_EXP 0.7860 0.6260 0.0000 0.6930 1.0990 13,451
LOG_N_IND 1.6590 0.4800 1.3860 1.6090 1.9460 13,451
LOG_DAYS 4.3430 0.7100 4.0070 4.5220 4.8980 13,451
LOG_DIST 3.5910 0.9940 2.9960 3.7610 4.3570 13,451
Panel C Multivariate regression
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR
REV 0.6362⁎⁎ 0.5777⁎⁎⁎ 0.7216 0.7753⁎⁎ 0.7386⁎⁎ 0.6441
(3.19) (2.73) (0.69) (2.52) (2.16) (0.54)
LOG_AQI_PRE 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004
(0.87) (0.97) (0.92) (0.40) (0.36) (0.28)
REV×LOG_AQI_PRE ‐0.1125⁎⁎ ‐0.0965⁎⁎ ‐0.1247⁎⁎ ‐0.1513⁎⁎ ‐0.1401⁎ ‐0.1772⁎⁎
(‐2.49) (‐2.02) (‐2.42) (‐2.16) (‐1.84) (‐2.17)
SIZE ‐0.0115⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0116⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0124⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0125⁎⁎⁎
(‐5.96) (‐6.03) (‐5.03) (‐5.06)
MB ‐0.0000 ‐0.0000 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0001
(‐0.06) (‐0.02) (‐0.50) (‐0.46)
BETA 0.0004 0.0004 ‐0.0005 ‐0.0005
(0.20) (0.24) (‐0.28) (‐0.27)
LOG_N_FOLLOW ‐0.0000 ‐0.0001 0.0005 0.0003
(‐0.01) (‐0.10) (0.28) (0.19)
PAST_RET ‐0.0010 ‐0.0010 ‐0.0017 ‐0.0017
(‐0.40) (‐0.38) (‐0.55) (‐0.52)
STAR 0.0004 0.0005 0.0010 0.0010
(0.55) (0.61) (0.93) (0.96)
LOG_EXP 0.0011 0.0011 0.0018 0.0019
(1.46) (1.42) (1.58) (1.56)
LOG_FIRM_EXP 0.0001 0.0002 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0002
(0.28) (0.31) (‐0.30) (‐0.25)
LOG_N_IND ‐0.0014⁎⁎ ‐0.0013⁎⁎ ‐0.0016⁎ ‐0.0015⁎
(‐2.66) (‐2.45) (‐1.94) (‐1.75)
LOG_DAYS ‐0.0009⁎⁎ ‐0.0010⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0019⁎⁎⁎ ‐0.0019⁎⁎⁎
(‐3.16) (‐3.01) (‐3.71) (‐3.62)
LOG_DIST ‐0.0004⁎⁎ ‐0.0004⁎ ‐0.0005 ‐0.0005
(‐2.01) (‐1.80) (‐1.21) (‐1.13)
REV Interacted with controls? NO YES NO YES
Observations 13,451 13,451 13,451 9,066 9,054 9,054
R-squared 0.199 0.209 0.209 0.233 0.243 0.244
(continued on next page)
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response to forecast revisions are consistent with investors understanding the detrimental effects of air pollution on analyst in-
formation production. Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion that air pollution represents a hidden cost to the capital
market.
Our study suggests several directions for future research. First, a more direct test could be conducted to examine how air pollution
affects the work pattern of analysts. For instance, how do they allocate time to work and leisure during pollution days? Second,
financial analysts are only one of the agents producing information for capital markets. Further studies can investigate how air
pollution changes the behaviors of other market participants such as auditors and the media.
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Appendix A. Variable definitions
This table tabulates the definitions of all variables used in the study.
Variable name Definition
TL = An indicator variable that equals 1 if an analyst revises his forecasts within two days (i.e. day 0 and 1) of a quarterly earnings
announcement of a focal firm, otherwise 0.
ACCURACY = An indicator variable that equals 1 if one analyst’s revised earnings forecast is more accurate than his prior earnings forecast, otherwise 0.
BOLD = An indicator variable that equals 1 if an analyst revises his forecasts below or above both his own prior forecast and peer consensus
forecasts, otherwise 0.
NEG_BOLD = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the analyst’s revised earnings forecasts are below his own prior forecast and peer consensus
forecasts, otherwise 0.
POS_BOLD = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the analyst’s revised earnings forecasts are above his own prior forecast and peer consensus
forecasts, otherwise 0.
AQI = The average daily air quality index between the earning announcement date and the analyst forecast revision date if an earnings forecast
is issued within two days of the earnings announcement date. If the earnings forecast is not issued within the above short window, we
measure AQI over the two-day window. In our study, AQI is measured for each analyst according to the air pollution level in his own
location (city). High levels of AQI correspond to high levels of air pollution.
LOG_AQI = The natural logarithm of AQI.
N_FIRM = The number of firms one analyst follows.
N_IND = The number of unique industries one analyst follows.
SIZE_BROKER = The number of analysts employed by a broker。
EXP = The number of quarters for an analyst between his first forecast report date recorded in the database and the current earnings
announcement date.
N_FOLLOW = The number of analysts who issued at least one report for the firm.
STAR = An indicator variable that equals 1 if one analyst was awarded the title of star analyst by the NEW FORTURE magazine in the preceding
calendar year, otherwise 0.
DAYS = The number of days between the analyst forecast revision date and the forecast period end date.
HOLDPERCT = The percentage of shares held by funds.
ROA = Net profit divided by total assets.
LEV = The total liabilities deflated by total assets.
Table 9 (continued)
Panel C Multivariate regression
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
This table present the results of estimating model (4). Panel A filters the sample used to estimate model (4). Panel B tabulates summary statistics of
all variables in model (4) and Panel C presents the estimation results. We compute CAR as the market adjusted cumulative market returns within
[0,1] of analyst forecast date (day 0 is the forecast date) to measure how investors value analyst revision. REV is the difference between current and
the most recent preceding forecast, deflated by the closing market price on day ‐1. LOG_AQI_PRE is the natural log of mean AQI over [‐1,0]. In the
regression model, we log transform all continuous analyst level control variables, and add firm and year fixed effects. All standard errors are
clustered by forecast date to correct for the cross-correlation in market returns on the same date. The sample period spans 2010‐2016. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. See the appendix for variable definitions.
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SALES_GROWTH = Quarter-to-quarter sales revenue difference deflated by the sales revenue for the same quarter last year
TRVOL = The average trading volume over the [‐1, +1] window of the three earnings announcement dates, scaled by the average trading volume
in the non-earnings announcement days in the previous year.
RETVAR = The standard deviation of daily stock returns over the [‐1, +1] window of the three earnings announcement dates minus the standard
deviation of daily stock returns over other non-earnings announcement days in the previous year.
MB = Total market capitalization plus the book value of total debt deflated by the book value of total assets
SUE = The quarter-to-quarter net profit difference deflated by the market capitalization on the day before the earnings announcement date.
SIZE = The logarithm of total market capitalization on the day before the earnings announcement dates.
ANNUAL = An indicator variable that equals 1 if an earnings announcement is made for annual earnings, otherwise 0.
INTERIM = An indicator variable that equals 1 if an earnings announcement is made for interim earnings, otherwise 0.
LOSS = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the ROA is less than 0, otherwise 0.
WIND = The average wind speed in a calendar day.
CLOUD_RAIN = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the weather in a calendar day is cloudy/rainy, otherwise 0.
VOLUME_0_REV = Abnormal trading volume within [0,1] of analyst forecast date (day 0 is the forecast date), where abnormal trading volume is daily
trading volume adjusted by the average trading volume over the 60 trading days before the analyst forecast date.
TO_END_DAYS = The number of days between an analyst forecast revision date and the forecasts period end.
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